

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY North Korea

REPORT

SUBJECT Anti-Communist Leaflets

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Information pertaining to anti-Communist leaflets observed in North Korea
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STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	FBI	X	AEC	X		X		X
(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)															

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Attach

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I. Details

Anti-Communist Leaflets
(as indicated)

the leaflet was a white, rectangular sheet of paper, measuring about 20 cm long and ten (10) cm wide and showing a picture of a plane and its pilot standing beside it.

a number of leaflets had been scattered around the area sometime before and the guard saw a leaflet being blown about by the wind and picked it up

- A) Judging from the fact that it was found to be crisp but damp (probably with dew), the leaflet that the gate guard picked up by chance should be one of those which were scattered around the Rear Department of the 46th Division about ten (10) days before.
- B) If the guard had picked up the leaflet in the mountains, he should have thrown it away for his own security. To go one (1) step further, if he had had no time to read the leaflet at the time, he then might have folded it in order not to have it discovered in his possession. Quite contrarily, the leaflet had nothing of such signs.
- C) Even if it may be allowed to assume that the guard had kept the leaflet for some time to read it later when no one was around him, the reason still remains in doubt why he produced it before many people, even while on duty, endangering his own security. Contrary

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to this assumption, the guard, as the truck came close by, did not stop reading the leaflet and held it in his hand even when the truck appeared before him.

- 2) As stated above [redacted] it was widely known among all the personnel of the Rear Department of the 46th Division that quantities of anti-Communist leaflets were scattered around the area. As a result, the division authority, attributing the incident to the activities of some enemy agents, tightened the overall security control for a period of three (3) days, confirming the rumor among all the military personnel of the Rear Department.

[redacted] the number of those who had actually observed the leaflets might be very limited among the personnel of the same department. As to the content of the leaflets, it was learned [redacted]

[redacted] that the leaflets had some specific statements

[redacted] the case [redacted]

[redacted] was judged by top military officers to have been the result of night activity of some enemy agents. The number of leaflets scattered was very small as compared with other cases in the past. To confirm this, a drive to capture enemy agents was made for three (3) days immediately following the incident.

2.

[redacted] leaflets in the surrounding hills, all of which were presumed to have been dropped during the war, and, therefore, were fairly obscure. They had two (2) types, both measuring about 20 cm long and ten (10) cm wide and printed on white paper.

[redacted] around the hills, it was quite common to find such leaflets printed in black, khaki, and red, the letters of which were still legible and the colors unfaded despite the fact that they had been dropped during the war.

3.

[redacted] some leaflets of the same type around the hills as mentioned in Paragraph 2 above. [redacted] signs of bundles of charred leaflets which had been burned. [redacted] a spot (CT 476424) about 300 meters southwest of the hill where it appeared that approximately 5,000 or 6,000 leaflets had been burned. At the same point, more than 1,000 half-burned

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pieces were observed in early '56, some of which were still bound up with wire. [redacted] they might have failed to properly fall off when dropped from the airplanes. They all showed a picture of Chinese soldiers holding empty rice-pots [redacted]

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4. The following instructions had been given to all officers and soldiers of the KPAF through appropriate political department company leaders in order to prevent military personnel from seeing enemy leaflets:

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- 1) To inform the responsible political department company leader of any delivery of leaflets when and if discovered.
- 2) Not to read the content of any leaflet wherever it may be picked up.
- 3) To burn or tear up all leaflets discovered without reading them.
- 4) To inform the political department company leader of any mass drop of leaflets so that they could be burned later.

Besides the above instructions, no other particular warnings had been issued to keep military personnel from reading the content of any leaflet. However, it was a well-known fact among the military that it was undesirable for them to be discovered by officers reading a leaflet or to pick up any leaflet before other persons.

5. [redacted] the propaganda method of dropping leaflets, as compared to [redacted] radio programs designed for the same purpose, was far more influential, as leaflets had more often emotional impact than the radio. [redacted]

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- 3) Those leaflets which had the picture of NK 100 Wpn note on the front side, were so curious and attractive that [redacted] one, promptly picked it up. From this experience [redacted] the idea was psychologically very effective, probably tempting others to pick them up too.

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